intro to signals

Why are there deceptive signals? Why are they a problem - and to whom?

deceptive signals arise when the signaller is able to benefit more through a dishonest signal than through an honest signal. deceptive signals are more likely to occur if either (1) the cost of dishonesty and possible punishment is worth the beneficial gain, (2) the cost of verification by the receiver is high and rarely paid, and/or (3) the cost of deception is low. they are a problem if the benefit to the dishonest entity is undeserved, and it deprives benefit and dilutes the reliability of those who signal honestly. the receivers must also pay a price if they choose to sink costs into verifying reliability of the signal, ensuring the truth of quality.

How reliable must a signal be for a signaling system to function? 100%? 51%?

the balance must lie between the the costs people are willing to pay, and the benefits received from giving off a certain signal.

How do signals become correlated with a quality? What happens when the signaler receiver interpret the signal differently?

... mismatch!

Describe two examples of signals in human society - one that is an example of an assessment signal and one that is a conventional signal.

For the first (assessment): how is the signal related to the quality? Is the signal costly? If so, how? Is it entirely reliable or are there deceptive forms of the signal?

having brilliant red hair and green eyes can be an assessment signal that a person's heritage is irish or of northern european descent. the correlation of signal to quality is quite high, given that people with these characteristics are generally perceived to be from these areas (and that is true a high percentage of the time, with few exceptions). red hair and green eyes are both recessive genetic traits and are naturally a rare combination.

the signal is costly in that for it to happen naturally, both parents need to carry the gene for it to be expressed in the offspring. however, the signal could be deceptively enacted if a person colored her hair with expensive techniques and dyes, bought green contacts, and applied makeup to skin for a complementary complexion (dotting reddish freckles on cheeks for seamless mimicry). unless the severity of deception is quite deep to ensure realism, the artificial coloring will look fake, and therefore the signal will not be successful. however, undergoing such a process to look a certain ethnicity is quite costly both in terms of money, one's own born identity and traits, and possible humiliation or rejection if the deception is discovered by others.

i would classify this signal as reliable because of the high costs of deception and relatively low benefits to the signaller (other than attracting those who might be particularly intriqued by irish/european people).

For the second (conventional): how is the signal related to the quality? Is this convention widespread or local to a small group? Is the signal frequently made deceptively? Is there a sanction against it? For both - what are the costs to the receiver in assessing the signal? Is the signal ambiguous - is there likely to be a mismatch between the sender's intent and the receiver's impression - or is there general agreement about the meaning of the signal?

carrying about an expensive, designer handbag is a conventional signal of women that, i believe, are now undergoing highly volatile transformations within the signalling evolution. if a woman carries a handbag that is branded visibly as from a high-end designer—e.g. louis vuitton, gucci, fendi, kate spade, christian dior—the quality of the wearer that is conveyed from the signal is that the woman is rich (so she can waste, in the veblen sense, a lot of money on an expensive accessory), fashionable (since the item is generally viewed as trendy and posh), and of a certain style attitude (for example, a laced versace gold lamé bag would signal a glamourous, sexy quality while a prim kate spade pink gingham tote would signal a preppy, well-bred socialite quality).

in my own experience, i believe the convention holds in areas where fashion news and trends are spread easily throughout the community (especially in large cities worldwide, although any town which distributes publications such as vogue or elle magazine would be prone). also, after some informal questioning of my male friends, i think the signal is primarily sent from females to other females, to indicate high social status and attractiveness, and invoke approval and envy. (my little poll reveals that most men have no clue about handbags, designer or otherwise, and they tend not to appoint any particular qualities to a girl based on the price or prestige of her bag.)

the cost of honestly owning a dior bag is relatively quite high (one goes for $1,175 on eluxury.com), versus a department store bag for about $40. however, a dishonest signal can be achieved by purchasing knockoff designer bags, which are convincing lookalikes with significantly cheaper price tags (under $100, sometimes under $50), on the black market. in china, the piracy abounds, with fakes reaching almost-perfect quality, with high-volume black market smuggling with mafia ties, etc. an illegal sanction definitely holds against fakes that copy the designer models exactly, but almost-like-but-not-quite models are able to slip by. some women find that the cost of buying a fake—chance of the fake being found out, guilty conscience of condoning merchandise counterfeiting, humility of shopping through an underground method, cheating oneself of quality and craftsmanship—is worth the benefit of deceptively signalling a quality of high-end fashion.

the cost for a receiver of the signal is quite low... they just have to view the bag and the person. the signal becomes nonexistent if the receiver does not know how to differentiate quality or worth of certain bags. you may view a cost of the receiver as time or energy spent researching prices or desirability on fashionable bags to ascertain a certain quality of the signaller. as for the intention versus inference situation, most fashionistas would be very good at spotting a fake, and so therefore the cost for someone with a knockoff bag to give off a deceptive signal around such people would be very high, in terms of being spotted immediately and the consequent humiliation and risks of social exclusion. however, perhaps in an environment that's less precise (maybe a suburban soccer mom neighborhood), the risk of a fake being discovered is lower, and the benefit of a deceptive signal would be higher (i.e. respect from other women). however, some mismatched signals might arise in any situation. a woman might think she's signalling glamour from her designer bag, but the receiver thinks the signaller is vain, wasteful, superficial, eager to please, conforming to trend, or hosting a sugar daddy. the social realm of women is quite complex, so i would think a lot of the signalling gets filtered by cultural expectations and/or catty competition. but as for now, as long as knockoff bags will continue to be available, the real designer items will be more flashy, more difficult to counterfeit, and more inaccessible to the general public to maintain the integrity of the original signal.